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Abstract 
This paper develops a model of the birth and death of cartels in the presence of enforcement 
activities by a Competition Authority (CA). We distinguish three sets of interventions: (a) 
detecting, prosecuting and penalising cartels; (b) actions that aim to stop cartel activity in the 
short-term, immediately following successful prosecution; (c) actions that aim to prevent the 
re-emergence of prosecuted cartels in the longer term. The last two intervention activities 
have not been analysed in the existing literature. In addition we take account of the structure 
and toughness of penalties. In this framework the enforcement activity of a CA causes 
industries in which cartels form to oscillate between periods of competitive pricing and 
periods of cartel pricing. We determine the impact of CA activity on deterred, impeded, and 
suffered harm. We derive measures of both the total and the marginal effects on welfare 
resulting from competition authority interventions and show how these break down into 
measures of the Direct Effect of interventions (i.e. the effect due to cartel activity being 
impeded) and two Indirect/Behavioural Effects – on Deterrence and Pricing. Finally, we 
calibrate the model and estimate the fraction of the harm that CAs remove as well as the 
magnitude of total and marginal welfare effects of anti-cartel interventions. ?
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Market Imperfection, C73 Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Repeated Games 
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1. Introduction 
 
In a recent briefing note for a conference that they were organizing4, high level 
representatives of the Dutch, European and UK Competition Authorities stated: “Many 
Competition Authorities use imperfect but accepted methodologies for calculating the direct 
impact of competition policy interventions on consumers. In contrast, we are not aware of any 
methodologies used by Competition Authorities to assess, let alone estimate, the deterrence 
effects of their work and to assess its macroeconomic impact. Such a methodology would be 
highly relevant for Competition Authorities as it would allow them to assess the total effect of 
their interventions and give a clearer picture of the impact of their work on the economy as a 
whole. In addition, taking deterrence effects into account could be informative for the 
prioritisation of resources across tools: if the relative size of the deterrence effects varies across 
tools, then using only the direct effects for resource allocation and prioritisation would be a 
mistake. It would also be interesting to understand better how deterrent mechanisms and effects 
have varied in the past depending on differences in competition policy enforcement.”?
 
The aim of this paper is to provide a conceptual framework that precisely addresses all these 
issues, albeit in the specific context of anti-cartel interventions.  Our approach is 
microeconomic rather than macroeconomic, but the aim is still to examine the total impact on 
aggregate welfare of interventions by a competition authorities.   
 
A comprehensive survey of the methodologies currently used for assessing the effectiveness 
of a Competition Authority (hereafter CA) in enforcing competition policy, including policy 
towards cartels, is contained in Davies and Ormosi (2010 and 2012).5 
 
As we explain more fully below, our framework involves modelling the birth and death of 
cartels.  In that regard it is very similar to work by Harrington and Chang (2009, 2015).6  
Harrington and Chang (2009) in particular is a major contribution since it is the first paper to 
establish conditions under which observable changes in the number of discovered cartels and 
the duration of cartels can be effective proxies for the change in the unobservable total 
number of cartels in existence and so can help us understand how this is affected by specific 
antitrust policies.7 Our work differs from theirs since our objective is to provide a general 
framework for evaluating the effects on welfare of a wider range of policy instruments than 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
4 “ Looking Beyond the  Direct Effects  of  the  Work of  Competition Authorities: Deterrence and 
Macroeconomic Impact”, 17-18 September 2015, Brussels.   
5 Evaluations of Competition Policy in general are contained in Baker (2003) and Werden (2008). Davies and 
Ormosi (2010), review a range of methodological approaches to evaluating competition policy.  Studies using 
particular approaches to evaluate specific aspects of competition policy are set out in Chang and Harrington 
(2010), Miller (2009) and Ormosi (2014) – the first two of which are concerned with the effects of leniency 
programs on deterrence and the last one offering an alternative methodology to identifying the fraction of 
detected cartels. For experimental work trying to obtain a direct measurement of deterrence in a controlled 
laboratory environment see Bigoni et.al. (2012). Finally, there is work using survey methodologies such as that 
of Deloitte (2007) and London Economics (2011) commissioned by OFT showing, respectively, that for each 
cartel detected by a CA at least another 5 (28) are deterred.  
6 There is a series of closely related papers by Harrington (2004, 2005, 2011, 2014) 
7 Harrington and Chang (2015) extend this approach to analysis of the effects of leniency programs. 
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they consider,8 and since it captures a more comprehensive set of effects, encompassing: the 
direct effect of detecting and stopping cartels; the indirect-deterrence effect9; an indirect-
price effect which captures the effect of policies on the price set by those cartels that do form. 
Moreover we consider both the total and marginal effects of a CA’s interventions and show 
how these can be decomposed into these three effects.  
 
Recent work by Davies and Ormosi (2014) has similar objectives to ours in that they want to 
measure the welfare effects of a general range of interventions and show how these can be 
broken down into direct and indirect effects.  The question they address is: “how much harm 
can cartels cause to an economy and how successful are CAs in rectifying that harm?”10 
While we also address this question, their conceptual framework and modeling approach is 
purely statistical and so is very different to ours.  They start from the amount of harm that a 
CA removes as a result of investigating and prosecuting cartels – essentially the Direct Effect  
that CAs think they can measure that was referred to in our opening quotation.  Davies and 
Ormosi call this Detected Harm.  They take as exogenous both the proportion of cartels that 
are deterred as a result of CA interventions and the proportion of undeterred cartels that are 
detected, and, assuming certain distributions of these two parameters, work backwards to 
obtain the distributions of potential harm; of undetected harm and of deterred harm and so 
various measures of the effectiveness of the CA.  Their approach differs fundamentally from 
ours since they have no model of cartel behaviour and so are unable to examine: (i) the effect 
of CA interventions on cartel pricing11; (ii) marginal effects of CA interventions; (iii) the 
effect of other enforcement parameters such as the penalty rate on the effectiveness of CA 
interventions12. 
 
Now, as indicated above, Davies and Ormosi (2014) treat detection of harm by a CA as 
equivalent to the removal of harm by a CA.  Indeed on p.8 of their paper they talk about the 
harm a CA “removes in the case it detects and intervenes”.  Other papers in the literature – 
e.g. Harrington (2004, 2005) – also assume that the detection and successful prosecution of a 
cartel (leading to the imposition of a penalty) brings it to an end.   
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
8The policy instruments they examine is a tougher penalty regime and an increase in the detection rate. As we 
will see below we consider these instruments and an additional two instruments that affect the re-birth of cartels. 
Essentially Harrington and Chang (2009) do not examine policy instruments that affect their parameter ?, the 
cartel rebirth rate. 
9We measure this by considering the fraction of those cartels that would have existed in the absence of a 
Competition Authority that continue to exist in the presence of a  CA and its enforcement activities 
10 Davies and Ormosi (2014), page 3. 
11 Bos, Davies and Ormosi (2015) contains some analysis of the effects of a CA’s penalty regime on cartel 
pricing.  The results largely replicate those in the literature – e.g. Katsoulacos & Ulph (2013) or Houba, 
Motchenkova and Wen (2010) – in showing that, when the penalty is imposed on profits then, if the probability 
of detection increases with the price set by the cartel, the cartel price will be below the monopoly price.   
12It is interesting to note however that when we set the values of our key intervention parameters to those 
implicitly assumed by Davies and Ormosi (2014), our calculations of the fraction of potential harm removed by 
a competition authority are consistent with theirs, showing that a CA can remove between 55 and 85% of all 
potential harm depending on the effort devoted to detection and prosecution. However, we also show that this 
conclusion is at the top end of the range and is very sensitive to Davies and Ormosi’s implicit assumptions about 
the key intervention parameters. Moreover our calculations of other measures of the effectiveness of CA 
interventions such as the ratio of the Total Effect to the Direct Effect also differ from theirs, showing that the 
difference in methodologies really matters.   
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However, Davies and Ormosi (2010) cite evidence that cartels re-emerge in industries in 
which a cartel had previously been prosecuted by a CA. Connor (2015) also argues that 
“recidivism is rampant”13, and that, in his sample there are: “at least 70 companies with ten or 
more violations between 1990-2015; scores of same market/same nation cases; many 
sequential violations, some of which are overlapping and so may not meet the start/stop/start 
legal definition of recidivism”. So the assumption that the detection, prosecution and 
penalising of a cartel brings cartel activity in an industry to an end, let alone a complete end, 
seems unrealistic.  
 
The polar opposite assumption - that cartels continue in existence even if they are detected, 
successfully prosecuted and penalised - is made in other papers in the literature, e.g. Motta 
and Polo (2003), Rey (2004), Katsoulacos, Motchenkova and Ulph (2015).  A justification 
for this assumption is that, when cartels form they anticipate the possibility of being detected, 
prosecuted and penalised; consequently, when this actually happens, it is treated as just a 
realisation of one of many anticipated risks they face, and, if nothing else has changed, if it 
was profitable to be in a cartel before prosecution it would remain profitable after 
prosecution.  However this too seems implausible, because if, following a successful 
prosecution, CAs implement certain interventions, some things might change following a 
successful prosecution:14  
? depending on the sanctioning regime in force, all the key personnel involved in 
operating the cartel might be jailed, or even debarred, so the capacity to form a cartel 
might be removed;  
? CAs might intensively monitor prices and other activities in that industry, increasing 
the risk of detection, and so reducing the incentive to form a cartel. 
Moreover, under this assumption (that cartels continue in existence after prosecution) CA 
interventions would have no Direct Effect, so it is an inappropriate basis for studying the 
relationship between the Direct Effect and Indirect Effects of CA interventions.  
 
The paper closest to our analysis is that of Harrington and Chan (2009) who assume that 
successful prosecution of a cartel in an industry will bring cartel activity to a stop 
immediately after prosecution but allow for the possibility that a cartel may re-emerge in the 
same industry at a future date.  However they do not explain why prosecution in itself brings 
a cartel to an end (albeit temporarily), and the assumption seems inconsistent with Connor’s 
evidence of sequential cartel activity.   
 
What none of the existing literature allows for is the possibility that, following a successful 
prosecution, a cartel might come to an immediate end (but also might not), and that, if it does, 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
13 Connor (2015) slide 44.  One does however have to treat these results with some caution, since Connor 
classifies recidivism as being present if a single firm is in two (potentially quite different) cartels at different 
points of time, rather than if the same, or equivalent,  cartel emerges in a given industry/market at two different 
points of time.  
14Houba, Motchenkova and Wen (2012) make an intermediate assumption that, following a successful 
prosecution, cartels either stop or continue in existence with some probability.  But, as pointed out above, 
neither of these two alternatives is attractive. 
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cartel activity might subsequently re-emerge in the same industry at a later date.  This is 
precisely the possibility that underpins the framework developed in this paper.  To capture 
this set-up we introduce three intervention parameters:  
? the probability that in any given period a cartel will be successfully prosecuted and 
penalised.15  
? the probability that, in the period immediately following a successful prosecution the 
industry reverts to competitive behaviour; 
? the probability that, if an industry in which a cartel was previously prosecuted is 
acting competitively at the start of any period, it continues to act competitively at the 
start of the next period.  
 
The first parameter reflects resources that a CA puts into detection, investigation and 
prosecution - activities on which much of the literature has focussed.  We assume that this is 
strictly less than 1 to capture the fact that CAs don’t have the resources to investigate every 
industry all the time.  
 
The second and third parameters reflect resources that CAs puts into preventing recidivism 
following successful prosecutions. To justify having two parameters, it is essential to 
distinguish between: 
? short-term interventions which are implemented for a limited period of time 
immediately following the successful prosecution of a cartel and which aim to 
prevent the continuation of price-fixing behaviour by the prosecuted cartel, and  
? longer-term interventions potentially involving sustained monitoring of activities in 
industries in which  a cartel has previously been prosecuted.  
 
The reason for making the distinction is as follows.  For the relatively small number of 
industries in which cartels have recently been prosecuted, it is plausible to assume that, for a 
limited period of time, CAs can monitor activities in these industries with an intensity16 that 
ensures that with a very high probability the price-fixing activity of the prosecuted cartel is 
brought to an end  in the short-run.  Indeed this probability could even be unity – the 
assumption of Davies and Ormosi (2014) and Harrington and Chang (2009).  Treating this 
probability parametrically allows us to test the sensitivity of conclusions to this assumption 
and is also consistent with Connor’s evidence of serial violations, and so the possibility that 
successful prosecution of a cartel by a CA does not always bring cartel activity to an end, 
even in the short-run.    
 
However it is implausible that CAs could indefinitely sustain this intense level of monitoring  
in every industry in which they have ever prosecuted a cartel.  Consequently, in the long term 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
15 Obviously in order to be prosecuted and penalised the cartel will have to have been detected and investigated, 
so, as in Harrington (2011) one could think of the probability of being successfully prosecuted as being the 
product of three probabilities: probability of detection , probability of investigation if  detected; probability of 
successful prosecution if investigated.  
16 And, in some jurisdictions, jail or debar officials that were responsible for price-fixing.  
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there is likely the probability of cartel activity re-emerging17 is likely to be higher than in the 
short-term. We capture this through the third intervention parameter above, for which  the 
only restriction we impose is that the probability is less than unity. It should be noted that 
these interventions relating to resources that the CA puts into preventing recidivism have not 
received much if any attention in the literature.  
 
These three intervention parameters give us a very rich framework within which to 
conceptualise the intervention activities of a CA, and one that encompasses the existing 
literature as special cases.  But, taken together they imply that CAs can at best only disrupt 
cartel activity, they cannot stop it for ever and prevent it from recurring at some point in the 
future.  Put differently, industries in which cartels are not deterred from forming will oscillate 
between periods when the industry is competitive and periods when it is cartelised.  The 
lengths of these periods are random variables determined by the magnitudes of the various 
intervention parameters. 
 
A final feature of the framework is that we explicitly model another enforcement 
parameter18– the penalty rate.  This enables us to address the final issue of concern to CAs as 
captured in our opening quotation – how the effectiveness of interventions depends on 
differences in policy enforcement.  It will also enable us to examine the effectiveness of 
intervention activities relative to that of raising the penalty rate.   
 
The key insights and conclusions of this framework are:   
? The Direct Effect that CAs measure – what Davies and Ormosi (2014) call Detected 
Harm - is an imperfect measure of the true Direct Effect,  essentially because it fails 
to reflect the dynamic nature of the environment within which CAs operate where 
cartel activity is only being disrupted by CA interventions not brought to a complete 
halt. While the true Direct Effect can sometimes be a little lower than which CAs 
measure –up to 10% – it can also be substantially higher – up to 3 times higher. 
? Nevertheless, for our central parameter estimates, the Total Effect of CA interventions 
is between 7.5  – 8.5 times as large as the Direct Effect that CAs measure.   
? There are strong complementarities between the various intervention parameters and  
between the Direct Effect of CA interventions and the Indirect Deterrence Effect – 
actions that improve the Direct Effect also increase deterrence. 
? If penalties are based on revenue then both the total and marginal Indirect Price 
Effects of interventions can be negative, though, for most parameter values that we 
have used, the absolute size is small. 
? The marginal effect of an increase in the penalty rate is around ten times smaller than 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
17 For the purposes of our model it does not matter whether it is the previously prosecuted cartel or some 
different, but equivalent, cartel that is responsible for this re-emergence of cartel activity. 
18We refer to this as an enforcement parameter rather than an intervention parameter  because the level of the 
penalty rate does not depend on the ongoing deployment of resources by the CA.   
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the marginal effect of an increase in the probability of successful prosecution.19 
? Potentially the most powerful marginal effect is that of longer-term interventions 
aiming at preventing recidivism – but this is very sensitive to the existing level of 
recidivism.  
The next section sets out a formal model that captures this framework. Then in section 3 we 
present the effects of cartels on welfare and in section 4 we decompose these effects in direct 
and indirect effects and we establish a number of comparative static properties. In section 5 
we provide an extensive range of illustrative numerical calculations of the direct and indirect 
effects, taking into account all available empirical knowledge about various parameters of the 
model. Section 6 offers concluding remarks.  
2. The Model 
2.1 Assumptions 
There is a continuum of industries, each producing a homogeneous product with identical 
constant marginal cost c and demand function ( )Q p . Industries differ in the exogenous 
number of firms, n, that operate in each industry, as well as in some other parameters as 
specified below. Within each industry symmetric firms compete in prices.20 We let 
( ) ( ) ( ),p p c Q p p c? ? ? ?  denote industry profits when the price is p.  It will also be useful 
to let ? ?? ?( ) resp.  ( ) ( )M M Mp c c p c? ??  denote the monopoly price (resp. profits) which 
would prevail if the market were served by a monopolist with constant unit costs c.  This 
price (resp. profit) is taken to be a strictly increasing (resp. decreasing) function of c.  
We let Cp c?  denote the price that will prevail if the industry is cartelised. This will be 
determined below.  If a cartel is successfully prosecuted it pays a penalty ? ?CB p?  where 
0? ?  is the penalty rate and ? ?CB p  is some base – e.g. revenue, profits, overcharge - which 
depends in general on the price set by the cartel. 
If an industry is such that cartels have been deterred from forming then it remains perfectly 
competitive with price equal to cost and zero profits.  So consider an industry in which cartels 
have not been deterred.  As explained in the introduction, at the start of any period it can be 
in one of two possible states – cartelised or competitive.  Let ? ?resp.  CART COMPV V  denote the 
expected present value of industry profits if the industry is cartelised (resp. competitive) at 
the start of any period. What happens in each of these states and the dynamics of how 
industries move between them is as follows. 
(a) Cartelised State 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
19 It is important to be clear that this statement refers solely to the percentage impact on harm of increasing 
certain enforcement parameters by a given percentage.  It takes no account of the resource costs of bringing 
about this percentage change. 
20There is Bertrand competition, so when an industry acts competitively price is driven down to costs and profits 
are zero. Also if a cartel is to be able to raise price above costs all n firms have to be in it.    
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If a cartel is in existence there is a probability , 0 1? ?? ? that it will successfully 
prosecuted and penalised by the CA.21 If undetected the cartel makes profits ? ?Cp?  and the 
industry continues for sure to be in the cartelised state at the start of the next period. If 
detected and prosecuted the cartel again makes profits ? ?Cp?  but has to pay a penalty 
? ?CB p? . In addition there is a probability , 0 1? ?? ? ?that the cartel will be shut down by 
the CA and so the industry will move to the competitive state at the start of the next period.  
Parameter ? captures the interventions of the authority for preventing short-run recidivism. 
So we have the following equation: 
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?? ?
1
(1 )
CART C CART
C C COMP CART
V p V
p B p V V
? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ?
? ?? ? ? ?? ?
? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ?
 ,  (1) 
where , 0 1? ?? ?  is a common discount factor that is assumed to be used by all industries 
and by the CA.22 
(b) Competitive State 
Here, in the current period, the industry makes zero profits but also faces no risk of being 
penalised.  Because of the efforts the CA puts into preventing recidivism in the long-term 
there is a probability , 0 1? ?? ?  that the industry remains competitive, and so a 
probability 1 ??  that a cartel re-emerges.  So we have  
(1 )COMP COMP CARTV V V? ? ?? ?? ? ?? ? .    (2) 
2.2 Cartel Profits and the Direct Effect of Interventions 
We can rewrite (1) and (2)  as:    
? ? ? ? ? ?1CART C C CART COMPV p B p V V? ?? ? ?? ???? ?? ? ? ? ?? ?  (3) 
and 
   ? ?? ?
1
1
COMP CARTV V
? ?
??
?? ?      (4) 
Substitute (4) into (3) and, after a bit of re-arranging, we get: 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
21In this paper ? is treated as constant across all industries. In future research we plan to investigate the 
implications of having it - and other industry characteristics – vary across industries. This would generate 
distributions of harm etc and so bring our framework closer to the statistical approach of Davies and Ormosi 
(2014).    
22We recognise that ? is going to vary across industries because of differences in growth rates, non-diversifiable 
risks etc.  As discussed later, this can be allowed for to some extent when dealing with deterrence.  
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? ? ? ?
.
1
C C
CART
p B p
V
? ??? ?
? ??? ?? ?     (5) 
where 
1 0 1
1
(1 )
? ????
??
? ? ? ?
? ?
.    (6) 
As mentioned in the introduction Katsoulacos, Motchenkova and Ulph (2015) assume that 
cartels always continue in existence following successful prosecution – so 0 1? ?? ? ?  in 
their model.  So, in their model, once formed, a stable cartel stays in existence for ever.  They 
show that, in these circumstances, the expected present value of cartel profits are: 
    
? ? ? ?
1
C Cp B p? ??
?
? ??? ?
?      (7) 
Consequently the variable ? is the fraction of the value that a cartel would make if it stayed in 
existence for ever that it actually makes given interventions by a competition authority that 
disrupt/impede cartel activity and cause the industry to act competitively for certain periods 
of time. Effectively ? measures the fraction of time that an industry is in a cartelised state,23 
while ? ?1 ??  measures the fraction of time in which cartel behaviour is impeded24by a CA’s 
disruptive interventions.  We will see below that the Direct Effect of a CA’s interventions 
will be related to the variable ? ?1 ?? ,  and that ? also affects the level of deterrence that CA 
interventions achieve.  Our framework allows us to disentangle these different effects.  
We have the following comparative-static results: 
Proposition 1  
(i) 0? ? implies 1? ? ;  
(ii) Given the assumption that 0 1?? ? , then 0? ?  implies 1 and  is? ?? strictly 
decreasing in ,   and  ? ? ? ,  taking a  minimum value 1 0? ?? ? ?  when 
1? ? ?? ? ? .25 
(iii) the penalty rate, ?, has no effect on ? – i.e. this enforcement parameter has no 
Direct Effect. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
23Alternative equivalent interpretations are that it is the fraction of all industries in which cartels exist that 
exhibit cartel behaviour in any given period, or the probability that a given industry in which a cartel exists 
behaves in  a cartelised fashion in any given period.   
24 We prefer the term “impeded” to the term “detected”  that is used by Davies & Ormosi and others, because, to 
have any direct effect CAs must do more than just detect and successfully prosecute cartels – they must take 
actions that bring cartel behaviour to an end and prevent it recurring. 
25 Notice that it then follows from (5) that ? ? ? ?CART C CV p B p? ?? ?  since, under these conditions, a cartel 
will only last for a single period, during which it will definitely be penalised. 
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Proof:  These all follow immediately from (6). ? 
The minimum value,? provides a measure of the maximal direct effectiveness of CA 
interventions.  
A final important implication of the formula for ? given in (6) is that there are strong 
complementarities between the intervention parameters in terms of their impact on reducing 
?.  So the greater the value of any two parameters the larger will be the percentage reduction 
in ? brought about by an increase in the third intervention parameter. 
Formally we have: 
Proposition 2 
(i) . (1 ), , ; . (1 )
1
i i
i
? ? ? ??? ? ? ?? ? ? ??
? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ; 
(ii) 1. . , ,   as  
2
i i
i
? ? ? ? ? ??? ? ?
? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ? ?? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ? . 
Proof: Part (i) follows immediately from differentiation of (6), while part (ii) follows 
immediately from (i).? 
2.3     Cartel Behaviour: Pricing 
If a cartel exists it will choose the price to maximise the expected present value of its profits 
subject to the ICC (12).  As shown in Katsoulacos, Motchenkova and Ulph (2015) in a wide 
range of cases of interest – e.g. fixed penalties, penalties that are based on revenue or profits 
– the optimum price is just that which maximises the expected value of profits without any 
constraint, so, drawing on that analysis we will take it that the cartel price is the 
unconstrained profit-maximising collusive price: 
    ? ?arg max ( )C
p c
p p B p? ??
?
? ?? ?? ?    (8) 
which means that the cartel price is a function purely of the toughness of the penalty regime 
? ??? .   
We have the following results regarding the cartel price as defined above: 
Proposition 3 
(i) The cartel price is independent of the intervention parameters   and  ? ?  
(ii) If there were no CA – and so 0 0? ?? ? ?  - then the cartel price is the monopoly 
price,  i.e. ( )C Mp p c? . 
(iii) If there is a CA that conducts investigations – and so 0 0? ?? ? ? -  then, 
depending on what penalty base is used, the cartel price can be above or below the 
monopoly price; 
?11?
?
(iv) The cartel price is a strictly increasing (resp. decreasing) function of ? depending 
on whether the cartel price is above (resp. below) the monopoly price.  Formally, 
0  as  
C
C Mdp p p
d?
? ?
? ? . 
Proof:  (i) Obvious from (8) in which  and  ? ? do not appear.  (ii)  again obvious from (8); 
(iii) follows from Katsoulacos, Motchenkova and Ulph (2015) where it is shown that if the 
penalty is on revenue and if both the penalty rate and the probability of successful 
prosecution are independent of the cartel price then the cartel price is unambiguously higher 
than the monopoly price,26 while if the penalty is based on profits the cartel price equals then 
monopoly price and, if the penalty is based on the overcharge the cartel price is 
unambiguously lower than the monopoly price;  (iv) since, from (8), Cp satisfies the f.o.c.  
? ? ? ? 0C Cp B p? ?? ?? ? , then, assuming the second-order conditions for a maximum are 
satisfied, it follows from standard comparative static analysis that 
? ? ? ?C C Cdpsign sign B p sign pd ??? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ? .  The result then follows from the fact that 
arg max ( )Mp p??  and consequently ? ? 0  as  C C Mp p p? ? ?? ? ? .? 
2.4 Cartel Behaviour: Deterrence 
2.4.1 Defection and Incentive Compatibility Constraint 
Given (5)  the expected profits per firm from being in  a cartel are 
CARTV
n
. 
We assume that if a firm defects from the cartel then it undercuts the cartel price, and enjoys 
the profits from doing so for a single period before the other cartel members react by 
punishing the defector.  
Since we allow for the possibility that the cartel price is above the monopoly price, it follows 
that, if this is the case, the best price for the defector to set is the monopoly price, while in all 
other cases the defector will set  a price just below the cartel price and so take the entire cartel 
profits.  Consequently the one-period defection profits are:27 
   ? ? ? ?
( ), ( )
, ( )
M C M
D C
C C M
c p p c
p
p c p p c
?? ?
? ??? ? ? ??
.   (9) 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
26Katsoulacos and Ulph (2013) show that if the penalty is based on revenue but either the probability of 
investigation or the penalty rate are perceived to be positively related to the cartel price then the cartel will set a 
lower price than predicted by Katsoulacos, Motchenkova and Ulph (2015) – but it may still be higher than the 
monopoly price.  
27This formula for defection profits was first  given in Katsoulacos, Motchenkova and Ulph (2015), who also 
showed that when penalties are imposed on revenue then the cartel price can be above the monopoly price.  
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We assume that remaining cartel members punish defection by reverting to competitive 
behaviour in the period immediately after the defection.  We assume that with probability 
1 ??  the remaining cartel members adopt an infinite grim trigger strategy and continue to act 
competitively for ever more.  However, with probability ? remaining cartel members do not 
do so, and, in this case we assume that if the industry is in a competitive state at the start of 
any period following a defection there is only a probability , 0 1? ?? ? 28that the industry 
will continue to be competitive at the start of the following period. If the industry does not 
remain competitive and reverts to a cartel at the start of the next period then its future profits 
will be given by CARTV  as given by (5)  above.  If we define V?COMP  as the expected present 
value of profits of an industry that is in the competitive state at the start of a period following 
a defection but has not implemented a grim trigger strategy.  This will satisfy the recursive 
equation 
    
?
V?COMP ? ? ?V?COMP ? (1?? )V CART???
?
??    (10)  
Given this, the Incentive Compatibility Constraint (ICC) - the condition that the expected 
present value of remaining within the cartel are at least as high as those of defecting – is: 
 
?
V CART
n
? ? D pC? ? ??? V?COMPn ? ? D pC? ? ? ?
2?(1?? )
1???
V CART
n
,   
which, on substituting (5), becomes: 
  
? ? ? ? ? ?2 (1 )1(1 ) 1
C C
D C
p B p
p
n
? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ??
? ?? ? ??? ? ? ?? ?? ?? ?
   (11) 
So now let  
2
(1 )
(1 )1
1
n ?
? ? ?
??
?? ? ? ???? ??? ?
     (12) 
be what we call the intrinsic difficulty29 of holding the cartel together, and the ICC can be 
written 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
28  Harrington and Chang (2009, 2015) assume that the probability of a cartel re-emerging is the same whether 
the industry is in a competitive state because of an intervention by a CA or because of  a defection.  Essentially 
they assume that ? ?? .  However we allow these probabilities to be different because they depend on very 
different behaviours:  ? depends on the behaviour of cartel members and their willingness to continue to forego 
cartel profits to punish a past defection; ? depends on efforts by a CA to prevent recidivism by, say, continuing 
to intensively monitor industries in which it previously prosecuted a cartel.  
29This is a generalisation of the formula in Katsoulacos, Motchenkova and Ulph (2015) where it is assumed that 
firms always implement the standard grim trigger strategy and so in all industries 0 (1 )n? ?? ? ? ? ? .  
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? ? ? ? ? ?C C D Cp B p p? ?? ? ?? ??? ? ?? .    (13) 
Notice that ? can vary across industries with ,   and  n ? ? 30. We can also allow for some 
variation in ? across industries and that, by assumption, the remaining parameters in (12) are 
exogenous constants and do no not depend on any enforcement parameters chosen by the CA.   
 2.4.2 Deterrence 
Given the cartel price we can now define the critical level of difficulty, ? , for which the ICC 
just holds.  From (13) this is defined by: 
    
? ? ? ?
? ?
C C
D C
p B p
p
? ??? ?
?? ? .    (14) 
It then follows from (13) that: 
? for those industries for which ? ? ? ,? the inequality in (13) holds, stable cartels will 
exist and these industries will oscillate between periods of cartelisation and  periods 
of competitions as the disruptive interventions of the CA force the break up cartels 
and enforce periods of competition; 
? for those industries for which ? ? ?  the inequality in (13) fails to hold, so no stable 
cartels exist and these industries remain in a state of permanent competition. 
 
We can re-write (14) as  
   
? ? ? ?
? ?
0 0
( )  where  ( )
C C
D C
p B p
p
? ?? ? ? ?
?? ? ? ? ? ,  (15) 
where  ? ?0 ??  is the critical level of difficulty that would arise if 0 1? ?? ? ?  and so CA 
interventions never shut down cartels, even temporarily.  It is the expression for the critical 
level of deterrence that appears in Katsoulacos, Motchenkova and Ulph (2015).  
 
Notice that, since Cp is a function solely of the toughness of the penalty regime,? ??? ,so 
too is 
0
( )?? . This gives rise to the following important insight: 
 
Proposition 4: For any given degree of toughness of the penalty regime,? ??? , actions 
taken by a CA to increase the direct effect of its interventions (i.e. reduce ?) automatically 
also increase the indirect deterrence effect of its interventions (i.e. reduce ? ). 
 
Proof:  Follows immediately from (15).? 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
30We can also allow for the possibility of some variation in ? away from the “typical” value assumed in the rest 
of the analysis.  Given the analysis of deterrence that we undertake below, this may help explain why some 
specific industries have stable cartels while in others they fall apart very quickly.   
?14?
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To obtain more detailed comparative static predictions about deterrence, we first provide the 
following Lemma: 
 
Lemma   If  C Mp p?  then 
0
( ) 0d
d
?
?
? ? . 
Proof:  From (8)  C Mp p?  implies  ? ? ? ?? ?
0
( )
C C
M
p B p
p
? ?? ?
?? ?  and so, from (13) and the 
Envelope Theorem we have 
? ?
? ?
0
( ) 0
C
M
B pd
d p
?
? ?
? ? ? ? .? 
Notice that if C Mp p?  then, from (8), ? ? ? ?? ?
0
( )
C C
C
p B p
p
? ?? ?
?? ?  and then  
    
  
? ?
? ?
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
0
2
( )
C CC C
C
C C
p B pB pd dpp
d dp p
? ?? ?? ?? ?
? ?? ?? ? ? ? ?? ? ?? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ?
, (16) 
where the first term on the RHS of (16) follows once again from the Envelope Theorem and 
is unambiguously negative.  However given Proposition 3(iv) it follows that if C Mp p?  then 
every component of the expression in the second term on RHS of (16) is positive, so, at this 
level of generality, it is impossible to unambiguously determine the sign of
0
( )d
d
?
?
? .  
However it is clear that in a very wide range of circumstances it will be negative.  So in all 
that follows we assume: 
    
0
0
( ) . 0
( )
d
d
? ?
? ?
? ?
?
.     (17) 
We then have the following comparative static results regarding deterrence: 
 
Proposition 5 
(i) If there were no CA  - and so 0? ?  - then ? ? 1  and  ?? ? 1 and so ? ? 1 
(ii) If a CA undertakes investigations- and so 0? ?  - then ?? ?1?? ?1. 
(iii)
0
0
( ). . . 0; . . 0; . . 0
( )
d
d
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ??
?? ? ? ?? ? ?? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ??
; 
(iv)
0
0
( ). . 0
( )
d
d
? ? ?
? ? ?
?? ?? ?? ? ?
. 
Proof:  (i) Follows from (6) and from Part (ii) of Proposition 3 which implies 
? ? ? ?D C Cp p? ?? ;  (ii) follows from the fact that ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?C C C D Cp B p p p? ?? ? ?? ? ? ; 
?15?
?
(iii) follows from (15), Proposition 2(i) and (17);  (iv) follows from (15), Proposition 1 (iii) 
and (17). ? 
Taken together parts (i) and (ii) imply that ?  defines the fraction of the benchmark 
industries31that will cartelise (albeit only intermittently) in the presence of an active CA and 
its anticipated disruptive interventions and penalty regime, while for those benchmark 
industries for which 1? ? ? ? , cartels will be deterred from forming in the presence of an 
active CA.  So ? gives us a precise measure of the deterrent effect of a CA’s enforcement 
actions. Parts (iii) and (iv) of the proposition tell us that all four enforcement parameters - 
, ,   and ? ? ? ?  - improve deterrence (lower ? ), but they work through different channels:  
  and  ? ?  work only through their effect on ?;  ? works only through its effect on 0? ; while 
? works through both channels.  
3. Cartels and Welfare 
Having determined how the intervention parameters ,    and  ? ? ?  and the penalty rate ? 
affect the three key variables ,   and Cp? ?  that are related, respectively, to the direct effect 
and the two indirect effects on deterrence and price we can now derive expressions for 
welfare and how this changes with these enforcement parameters.   
We assume that the relevant welfare objective for a CA is consumer surplus32 and let 
( ) ( )
p
CS p Q x dx
?? ?  denote the flow of consumer surplus in a period when the price is p.   
To begin, consider industries for which 0 ? ? ? ?  and so cartels might exist for certain 
periods of time.  Let CARTW  be the expected present value of consumer surplus when, at the 
start of a period a cartel is in existence and let COMPW  denote the expected present value of 
welfare when, at the start of a period the industry is temporarily competitive. By analogy with 
(3) and (4) these satisfy the recursive equations 
? ? ? ?1CART C CART COMPW CS p W W? ?? ???? ? ? ?    (18) 
and 
   ? ? ? ? ? ?1 1COMP CARTW CS c W?? ? ?? ? ? ? .   (19) 
As before we can solve to get   
    
? ? (1 ) ( )
1
C
CART
CS p CS c
W
? ?
?
? ?? ? ,   (20) 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
31Those with 1? ?  that would have cartelised had there been no CA. 
32 Everything that follows will go through in a completely analogous fashion if the CA uses a total welfare 
standard, and just replace the function ( )CS p  with ( ) ( ) ( )TW p CS p p?? ? . 
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where ? is once again given by (6).   
The expression in (20) is directly analogous to that in (5), the main difference being that, in 
periods when the industry is temporarily competitive, net private profits are zero whereas 
consumer surplus is positive – and indeed larger than when the industry is cartelised. Define 
(1 )CART CARTCS W?? ?  as the constant per-period flow of consumer surplus whose present 
value would by CARTW , and then (20) becomes:  .      
   ? ? ? ?(1 )CART CCS CS p CS c? ?? ? ? .   (21) 
Taking account of the fact that stable cartels exist in only a fraction , 0 1? ? ? ?  of the 
industries in which they would have existed had there been no CA, while the remaining 
fraction of industries are competitive and generate a permanent flow of consumer surplus 
( )CS c , we can define the average consumer surplus that arises in this benchmark set of 
industries from having an active CA in place as   
? ?1 ( )CARTCS CS CS c? ? ? ?? .    (22) 
From (21) this becomes 
   ? ?( ) ( ) CCS CS c CS c CS p? ? ?? ?? ?? ? .    (23) 
So average consumer surplus is just the consumer surplus that would arise if all the 
benchmark industries were competitive minus the loss of surplus that arises from having 
cartels form in a fraction?  of these industries, but where, because of the disruptive actions of 
the CA, this loss amounts to only a fraction ? of the loss of consumer surplus 
? ?( ) CCS c CS p? ??? ? that would arise if these cartels were permanently in existence.   
To capture this intuition more formally we can re-write (23) as: 
    ? ?( ) , , CCS CS c H p?? ? ?     (24) 
where, 
   ? ? ? ?, , ( )C CH p CS c CS p? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ,   (25) 
is the Harm33 Actually Suffered by an economy because of cartels.  This harm arises only in  
(i) those industries where cartels are not deterred; 
(ii) for these industries only for the fraction of time when the harm is not impeded by 
CA interventions.  
Associated with these situations where, due to CA interventions, harm is prevented from 
arising, we define the amount of: 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
33 That is loss of consumer surplus 
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? Deterred Harm  as  ? ? ? ?1 ( ) CCS c CS p? ?? ? ?? ? ; 
? Impeded Harm   as  ? ?(1 ) ( ) CCS c CS p? ? ?? ? ?? ? .   
Notice that both of these depend on the price, Cp , set by the cartel, since they reflect the 
amount of harm that would have been suffered had cartels not been deterred/impeded.34 
Drawing on the discussion of Davies and Ormosi (2014) we can also define the Potential 
Harm,  0H , as that which would arise if there were no CA. In such a situation we would have 
0? ?  which, from the analysis in Section 2, implies 1, 0 C Mp p? ?? ? ? ? and 
consequently 1? ?  and so from (25), 
   ? ?0 ( ) MH CS c CS p? ? .     (26) 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate both actual harm, H and potential harm 0H . 
?
      Figure 1: Harm Actually Suffered, H     Figure 2: Potential Harm, 0H  
 
The expressions in (23) - (26) are central to all our analysis of the direct and indirect effects 
on welfare of CA interventions, to which we now turn.     
4. Direct and Indirect Welfare Effects of Anti-Cartel Policies 
Given the measure of average consumer surplus in (23) there are two issues that we can 
address.   
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
34 Of course, as in Katsoulacos, Motchenkova and Ulph (2015)  the actual amount of harm arising in industries 
where cartels have been deterred/impeded is zero, whereas Deterred/Impeded Harm measures the harm that 
would have been suffered had cartels NOT been deterred/impeded. 
?18?
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The first is the calculation of the total welfare benefit that society obtains from having an 
active competition authority in place.  By comparing this to the total value of the resources 
that have been given to the CA we can determine the benefit-cost ratio it is obtaining from 
those resources and so whether it is achieving any target ratio that has been set.35  Two 
related sub-issues are: 
? how to decompose the total welfare effect into a direct effect plus two indirect effects 
– on price and deterrence; 
? the size of the currently unmeasured indirect effects relative to the direct effect that 
CAs think they can currently measure – at least to some degree. 
Answering this second sub-issue helps a CA understand by how much it can scale up its 
measure of the direct effect to obtain a measure of the total effect.  
The second issue is to calculate the marginal effects of putting more resources into the 
various kinds of interventions.  This is important in helping CAs decide whether they are 
putting the right amount of resources into the various kinds of interventions in a particular 
area of anti-trust enforcement – e.g. investigations vs resources used in keeping industries 
competitive once cartels have been closed down.  But it could also be relevant to deciding 
whether resources should be switched between different areas of antitrust enforcement – e.g. 
mergers vs cartels vs dominance cases.  There are three related sub-issues: 
? how to decompose these marginal benefits into a marginal direct effect plus the two 
marginal indirect effects – on price and deterrence; 
? the size of the currently unmeasured marginal indirect effects compared to any of the 
marginal direct effects that CAs may be able to measure – at least to some degree;  
? understanding whether and why the ratio of the sum of the marginal indirect effects to 
the marginal direct effect might vary systematically across different types of 
intervention; different areas of anti-trust enforcement; and different industries.   
This final issue is important because, if this ratio were constant, then resource deployment 
could be determined solely on the basis of the marginal direct effects.   
We consider the two issues in turn. 
4.1 The Total Welfare Benefit of a Competition Authority 
There are a number of ways that one might think about measuring the total benefit that arises 
from having a CA in operation. One rather natural way is to compare the value of the average 
consumer surplus when there is an active competition authority in place - as given by (23) - 
with the average consumer surplus in the counterfactual of having no CA in place. The 
discussion of Potential Harm above set out the implications of there being no CA.  Using this 
approach, the Total Effect (TE) of having an active competition authority is: 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
3510:1 in the case of the CMA. 
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 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?( ) ( )C M C MTE CS p CS p CS c CS c CS p CS p? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ?? ? , (27) 
where the second expression follows by substituting (23).   
However, it is easy to check that, from (25) and (26), this is equivalent to defining the Total 
Effect (TE) of having an active competition authority as being the difference between the 
Potential Harm and the actual harm.  So we have 
    ? ?0 , , CTE H H p?? ? ? .    (28) 
Turning to the issue of how to decompose this into a Direct Effect and two Indirect Effects, 
we can rearrange the expression in (26) to obtain: 
? ?? ?
? ? ? ?? ?
? ? ? ?? ?
(1 ) ( )
1 ( )
C
C
C M
TE CS c CS p
CS c CS p
CS p CS p
? ? ?? ? ? ? ?? ?
? ?? ? ? ?? ?
?
   (29) 
The first term on the RHS of (29) is the Direct Effect (DE) of having an active CA in place.  
For those industries in which cartels are not deterred it shows the gain in consumer surplus 
from blocking cartel activity for a certain fraction of time through disruptive interventions by 
the CA.  This is what we defined above as Impeded Harm. It is a close analogue of what 
Davies and Ormosi (2014) call Detected Harm36 - although, as we will explain below, what 
they and competition authorities actually measure as the direct effect/detected harm is 
somewhat different from the Direct Effect as defined above.  Notice that the Direct Effect is 
larger: 
? the smaller is ? - so the more effective is the CA at blocking harm; 
? the larger is ?  - so the less effective is the CA in deterring cartels37; 
? the higher is Cp  - so the less effective is the CA in driving down the price set by 
cartels. 
So, as noted by Davis & Ormosi (2014), Sorgard (2015)38 and others, a large Direct Effect 
may not always be a source of congratulation for a CA.    
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
36As explained above in footnote 21, theirs is a potentially misleading description of what the Direct Effect 
captures, since, as we stressed above in the introduction and in Proposition 1, in order to have a positive Direct 
Effect  - i.e. in order to have 1? ? - CAs have to do more than just detect and prosecute cartels – they have to 
take actions to stop them – even if only temporarily.  Davies and Ormosi (2014) recognise this because, on p.8, 
they talk about the harm a CA “removes in the case it detects and intervenes”, so they implicitly assume that 
detection automatically leads to the removal of harm, and so, at the very least, are effectively assuming that 
1? ? .  To the extent that the removal of harm is permanent they may also be implicitly assuming that 1? ? .   
37 This observation suggests there could be potential incentive problems for a CA trying to pursue a policy of 
directing resources to maximise the total effect of its actions.  For if staff performance is assessed on 
effectiveness of clearing up cases, then there could be advantages in having a weak deterrent effect since there 
would be a larger pool of cases to be worked with some “low hanging fruit” to be picked.  
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The second term on the RHS of (29) is the Indirect Deterrence Effect (IDE) of having a CA. 
for it measures the gain in consumer surplus that society obtains because the anticipated 
enforcement activities of the CA deter cartels from forming in a fraction ? ?1? ?  of the 
benchmark industries.  As noted above, following Davies and Ormosi (2014), we can also 
refer to this as the amount of Deterred Harm.  Notice that the expression for Deterred Harm 
does not contain ?, for the very good reason that, if a CA deters cartels from forming in 
certain industries, society obtains all of the benefit from its doing so irrespective of what 
proportion of harm the CA would have blocked had cartels actually formed.  However, as 
noted above, the better is the CA at blocking harm – i.e. the lower is ? –the larger is ? ?1??  
and so the greater is the magnitude of Deterred Harm.  However, as with Impeded Harm, the 
magnitude of Deterred Harm is greater the higher the price that would have been set by 
cartels.   
The third term on the RHS of (29) is the Indirect Price Effect (IPE). For it measures the 
impact on consumer surplus that arises because, anticipating the intervention of the CA, 
cartels now set the price Cp rather than the price Mp  that they would have set had there been 
no CA. Notice that the expression for this effect contains neither  nor  ??  and applies for 
the entire benchmark .  This is because, as discussed above, the effects that a CA’s activities 
have on the price set by cartels affects the magnitudes of Deterred Harm and Impeded Harm 
as well as the harm actually suffered. Notice also that if C Mp p?  the Indirect Price Effect 
will be negative.  
So we have the following simple arithmetical decomposition39 of the Total Effect: 
   TE = DE + IDE + IPE.     (30) 
Figure 3 below illustrates Potential Harm, 0H , harm actually suffered, H  and the 
decomposition of the Total Effect ? ?0TE H H? ?  into these three effects.  It is drawn for the 
case where C Mp p? . 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
38 However neither Davies and Ormosi (2014) nor Sorgard (2015) take any account of the indirect price effect, 
so their comments are based purely on the observation that a large direct effect could be consistent with a weak 
deterrent effect.   
39Once again this is rather different from Davies and Ormosi (2014) who assume a multiplicative 
decomposition.  
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Figure 3: Total Effect, 0TE H H? ?  
Notice that, even though there are complex interactions between these three effects, the total 
effect is obtained by a straightforward summation of the Direct Effect and the two Indirect 
Effects.40 
To get a sense of just how large is the Total Effect – and so how effective is a CA -  there are 
two performance measures we could calculate.   
First, following Davies and Ormosi (2014), we could measure the Total Effect relative to 
Potential Harm, 0
TE
H
.  This shows how much of the potential harm the CA is removing.  
Second, we could measure the Total Effect and the Indirect Effects relative to the Direct 
Effect that CAs think they can measure. But this involves two rather separate questions:   
? how large are the indirect effects relative to the direct effect as defined above in (29) ? 
? how large are the indirect effects relative to a measure of the direct effect that a CA might 
actually be able to calculate using data it can readily observe?    
In an obvious notation the ratio of the two indirect effects to the direct effect as defined in 
(29), are given by: 
 
? ? ? ? ? ?
? ?
1
;
.(1 ) .(1 ). ( )
C M
IDE IPE C
CS p CS pIDE IPER R
DE DE CS c CS p? ?
? ??? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ?? ?
. (31) 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
40 This contradicts the assertion by Sorgard (2015) that these interactions imply that one should not add up the 
three effects. 
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We can re-write the second term on the RHS of (31) as: 
  
? ? ? ?
? ?
( ) ,   where  ( )=
.(1 ) ( )
C M
IPE C
CS p CS p
R
CS c CS p
? ??
? ??? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ?? ?
  (32)  
Here ( )??  is the ratio of the difference in consumer surplus under a cartel and monopoly to 
that between having a cartel and competition.  It will be negative if the cartel price is above 
the monopoly price.   
Now the direct effect as defined above  in (29)  depends on the two terms  and ??  which are 
going to be incredibly hard for a CA to actually measure, essentially because they both 
depend on counterfactuals that are not directly observable: 
? ? depends on having a view about the industries in which cartels might have arisen in 
the absence of a CA;   
? ? depends on the present value of profits that a cartel would have made had it stayed 
in existence for ever. 
What a CA should be able to calculate using data that is readily observable is the number of 
cartels it actually investigates, penalises and stops in any given period. Within our framework 
this would be ?? ?  - which a CA could observe even if it cannot observe the individual terms 
in this expression. If we multiply this by the gain in consumer surplus, ? ?( ) CCS c CS p? ??? ? , 
that arises from forcing an industry to set the competitive price rather than the cartel price we 
get what we can call the Observable Direct Effect (ODE): 
    ? ?( ) CODE CS c CS p?? ? ?? ? ?? ? .   (33) 
This is the exact analogue of what Davies and Ormosi (2014) call Detected Harm. So, using 
(29) and (31), the amount by which a CA has to scale up its Observable Direct Effect  to 
obtain a measure of the Total Effect of its actions is:   
? ?. 1 IDE IPETE DE TE DE R RODE ODE DE ODE? ? ? ? ,   (34) 
where, from  (29) and  (6) we have: 
    
? ?1 .
1
DE
ODE
? ???? ??
?? ? ? ,    (35) 
What (34) brings out is that there are TWO reasons why the Total Effect of a CA’s actions 
might differ from the Direct Effect that they can and do measure.  The first, which everybody 
recognises and discusses, is the fact that the Direct Effect fails to capture the 
indirect/behavioural effects of a CA’s interventions.  But the second, which has not received 
any attention, is that the Direct Effect that CA’s can measure (the Observable Direct Effect) 
?23?
?
may not actually be the true Direct Effect. From the expression in (35) the true Direct Effect 
may be either greater or less than the Observable Direct Effect. In the next section we will 
show that both outcomes are possible.41 
4.2 The Welfare Effects of Marginal Increases in Enforcement Parameters 
Now consider the welfare effects of small increases in the intervention parameters 
, and  ? ? ? .  Analogously to the analysis in the previous section, we can measure these as 
either the marginal change in average consumer surplus as defined in (26) or, equivalently, 
the marginal change in harm as defined by (28).  For simplicity we use the latter approach.   
Differentiate (28) and we get the Total Marginal Effect (TME) of a small increase in 
intervention , ,i ? ? ??  as:42 
C
C
H H H H p
i i i p i
?
?
? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ? ?? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ? ? ???? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ?
,   (36) 
The first term on the RHS of (36) is the Marginal Direct Effect(MDE) since it shows the 
impact on welfare arising through the effect that a marginal increase in an intervention has on 
?,  taking as given the behaviour of  the cartel as reflected in ?  and Cp .   
The second term on the RHS of (36) is the Marginal Indirect Deterrence Effect (MIDE) , 
since it shows the impact on welfare arising through the effect that a marginal increase in an 
intervention has on ? - the proportion of industries in which stable cartels choose to form - 
taking as given both   and  Cp?  
The third term on the RHS of (36) is the Marginal Indirect Price Effect (MIPE) since it 
shows the impact on welfare arising through the effect that a marginal increase in an 
intervention has on Cp   - the price set by those stable cartels that do form - taking as given 
both    and  ? ? . From Proposition 3(iv) this will be negative if C Mp p? . 
So, analogous to (30), we get a simple decomposition of the total marginal effect of an 
intervention into a direct effect and two indirect effects: 
    TME MDE MIDE MIPE? ? ?    (37)  
We can  re-write  (36) in elasticity form: 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
41 Notice that 0 1DE ODE? ??? ? ? ?  but if 1 then  1DE ODE
?? ? ?? ? ?  and if, say, 0.9? ?  
this implies 9DE ODE ?? .   
42Notice that because Davies and Ormosi (2014) have no theory about how the crucial performance variables ? ?, , Cp? ? are determined by the underlying intervention parameters they are unable to provide any analysis of 
these marginal effects.  
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Now, from (25) we have: 
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Substitute this and the results in Proposition 2 (i) and Proposition 5 (iii) & (iv) into (39) and 
we get; 
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   (43) 
These various formulae reflect the fact that, as noted in Propositions 1, 2, 3 and 5,  the 
various enforcement parameters work through different channels.   
If we substitute (43) and (42) into (41) we get the following relationships between the 
marginal effects of the various enforcement parameters: 
   
. . . ;
. .
1
H H H
H H H
H H
H H
? ? ?
? ? ?
? ? ??
? ? ??
? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ?? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?? ?? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ?? ? ? ?
   (44) 
We then have the following proposition regarding the marginal effectiveness of the different 
enforcement parameters. 
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Proposition 6 
(i)  If  C Mp p?  then . 0H
H
?
?
? ??? ?? ??? ? , but if 
C Mp p? then 
? ?0 0( ). 0  as  . . . 0
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Proof: (i) if C Mp p?  then, from Proposition 3 (iv) an increase in ? does not raise the cartel 
price, so every term on the RHS of (43) is non-negative and the second is strictly positive.  
However if C Mp p?  then from Proposition 3 (iv) an increase in ? raises the cartel price, so 
the final term on the RHS of (43) is negative, and so an increase in the penalty rate, ?, will 
reduce harm if the deterrence effect it has via 
0?  outweighs the negative price effect.  (ii)  
and (ii) are direct implication of equation (44).? 
So we have the following results based on the analysis of welfare effects of marginal 
increases in enforcement parameters: 
? It follows directly from comparison of (41) and (43) that an increase in the 
probability of detection is always more effective than increasing the penalty rate; 
? By comparing (41) and the first expression in (42) we conclude that provided an 
increase in the penalty rate reduces harm, an increase in the probability of detection 
also has a bigger effect than increasing the probability that successful conviction 
stops cartels; 
? Comparison of expressions in (42) implies that increasing the effectiveness of 
keeping industries competitive can have a more powerful effect than increasing the 
probability of stopping cartels when the CA is already pretty effective at keeping 
industries competitive, i.e. when ?? >1/2.  
 
5. Illustrative Calculations of the Direct and Indirect Effects 
As discussed above, the framework indicates that the direct and indirect deterrence effects are 
going to be extremely hard to measure in any direct way, since both  and  ? ?  are defined in 
relation to counterfactuals that relate to what would have happened in the absence of a CA.   
So one approach to trying to calculate the various direct and indirect effects in relation to 
what a CA might actually be able to measure is to use whatever empirical evidence is 
available to calibrate the model’s parameters, and then use the formulae in Section 2 to 
calculate the three performance variables , , Cp? ?  and hence the formulae in Section 4 to 
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calculate all our various measures of the effectiveness of a CA.  In this section we take a very 
preliminary step in this direction.  Our aim is not to provide an exhaustive analysis of how the 
various direct and indirect effects vary with the underlying parameters, but rather to show 
that this approach is feasible and to get a feel for the parameters to which our conclusions 
seems most sensitive.   
The model is based on parameters: , , , , ,c? ? ? ? ? , and on the two functions ( )  and  ( )Q p B p . 
To begin, it is helpful to think about the length of the period on which the model is built.  The 
model is based on the assumption that a CA can carry out a successful cartel investigation in 
a period.  For hard-core cartels it would be reasonable to assume that such an investigation 
might be successfully concluded in one year.  While our model does not relate solely to hard-
core cartels we will nevertheless assume that the appropriate interpretation of a period is a 
year.    
With this in mind we discuss in turn the calibration of our various parameters.  We begin with 
the four enforcement parameters, , ,   and  ? ? ? ? .    
?:  In their analysis Davies and Ormosi (2014), cite empirical evidence that the probability of 
detection ranges from 0.1 to 0.33, and assume a uniform distribution between these bounds.  
So we will report results for the three values 0.1, 0.2, 0.3? ? .  However, following the 
work of Bryant and Eckart (1991), a widely used value is 0.15? ? .  We have undertaken 
calculations for this value of ? as well.  Obviously the resulting values for all our various 
measures of CA effectiveness lie between those obtained for 0.1  and  0.2? ?? ? , though, 
given the non-linearity of our performance variables such as ?, they do not lie exactly half 
way between, though a straightforward interpolation will give a good approximation.43 
 
?: As noted above, Harrington (2004, 2005) and Davies and Ormosi (2014) effectively 
assume that 1? ? . So, to facilitate comparison with their analysis, we will also allow ? to 
take the value 1? ? . However, our framework allows us to test the sensitivity of the 
conclusions to this implicit assumption, so we also examine how our results change if 0.8.? ?  
 
?:  As noted above, it is implausible to assume that CAs have the resources to continuously 
monitor industries after a successful intervention.  Moreover, both Davies and Ormosi (2009) 
and Connor (2015) cite evidence that cartels do indeed re-emerge in industries following CA 
interventions. So it is implausible that 1? ? . However, as suggested above, one 
interpretation of what Davies and Ormosi (2014) mean by removing harm is that they are 
talking about permanent removal.  So to understand what might be driving their conclusions 
we want to allow the possibility that ? can be quite large. Accordingly we will undertake 
calculations for the three values of 0.1, 0.5, 0.9? ? . 
 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
43 Precise figures available from the authors on request. 
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?:  We assume throughout that penalties are based on revenue and that neither the penalty rate 
nor the probability of detection depend on the cartel price.  In line with rates that apply in 
countries that use revenue as the penalty base for the bulk of our analysis we assume a 10% 
penalty – i.e. 0.1? ? .  However in order to address the question posed by CAs in the 
quotation at the start of the paper about how the effectiveness of interventions depends on 
“differences in competition policy enforcement” we discuss how our conclusions are affected 
if, instead, 0.2? ? .  Given our assumptions about the penalty structure, the cartel price will 
be above the monopoly price and so both the absolute and marginal indirect price effects will 
be negative.   
 
Our framework also depends on a number of model parameters: 
 
c:  We normalise prices by assuming that the competitive price 1c ? . 
 
Consistent with this we assume that the demand function is ( ) 1Q p p?? ? ? 44 where 
. >0dp Q
dQ p
? ? ?  is the inverse price elasticity evaluated at the competitive price. Connor and 
Lande (2012) suggest that the elasticity of demand lies in the range 0.95 to 1.65 with an 
average value of 1.3, which would imply values for ? of 1.05, 0.61 and 0.77 respectively.  In 
what follows we allow ? to take the three values 1.0, 0.8, 0.6? ? .  However it turns out that 
our results are not very sensitive to ?, so in this section of the paper we report results just for 
the case 0.8? ? .  
 
?: The discount rate, ?, is both the rate at which cartels discount future profits and the rate at 
which CAs discount future consumer surplus. There is little agreement on what value this 
should take, with a wide variety of values being used in different studies.45  We use ? = 0.9 as 
the central value in our calculations. However we report how our conclusions are affected if, 
instead, ? takes a range of other values between 0.8  and  0.98? ?? ? .46 
 
The Appendix gives more details of the formulae used in the calculations given the functional 
forms described above and a full list of the resulting calculations, including the sensitivity of 
the conclusions presented here to the assumed value of the penalty rate ? ?0.1? ?  and to the 
model parameters ,? ? .   
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
44Given the assumptions made above about the penalty base, this implies ? ?( ) 1B p p p?? ? ? . 
45 As is well known the value of this parameter will in practice be affected by considerations such as the 
frequency of interaction between cartel members and the evolution of demand, that will vary widely across 
industries, and from which we abstract here. We also performed a sensitivity analysis with respect to discount 
factor and other parameters of the model. The detailed results on sensitivity analysis are available from authors 
upon request.  
46 We have performed several sensitivity checks with respect to discount factor. For a range of discount factors 
between 0 .8   and   0 .98? ?? ? additional numerical simulations presented in the Appendix show that most 
of the effects are monotonic in ?. Namely, ?  and ODE  are decreasing in ?. On the other hand, TE, TE/H0, and 
TE/ODE are increasing in ?. TE/ODE ratio ranges between 2 and 13 for the range of discount factors and other 
parameters we consider. Note also that RIDE is non-monotonic in ?.  
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5.1 The Total Effects of a Competition Authority’s Interventions. 
 
We start by considering how good a job a competition authority does in removing some of 
the potential harm that would have existed had there been no authority in existence. This is 
measured by 0TE H  and Table 1 sets out the values for this that emerge from our 
framework.47 
Table 1: 0TE H  
0.9, 0.8, 0.1? ? ?? ? ?   
 
? 
?  1   0.8  
? 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.3 
0.9  0.552 0.751 0.843 0.488 0.694 0.799 
0.5  0.281 0.463 0.587 0.239 0.405 0.527 
0.1  0.194 0.341 0.454 0.164 0.296 0.401 
 
If we look at the left hand side of the table, where 1? ?  and the top row, where 0.9? ?  and 
so the set-up is effectively that which is implicitly assumed by Davies and Ormosi (2014) 
then we see that as the amount of effort that CAs put into investigations varies from a low 
value of 0.1? ? to the high value of 0.3? ?  then the fraction of harm removed increases 
from 55.2% to 84.3% with the intermediate value of 75% when 0.2? ? . These are almost 
exactly the figures produced in Table 2 of Davies and Ormosi (2014) where the results are, 
55.5%, 86.9% and 76.7% respectively. 
However the table also brings out just how sensitive these figures are to the implicit 
assumptions. So, for example, if the probability of keeping an industry competitive, ?,  drops 
from 90% to 50%  then the fraction of potential harm removed by a CA varies from 28.1% to 
58.7% with an intermediate value of 46.3%. So they have almost halved.   
Comparing the LHS of Table 1 with the RHS we see that lowering the proportion of detected 
cartels that are immediately stopped, ?, from 100% to 80% also reduces the amount of 
potential harm removed by a Competition Authority.   
So we have: 
Result 1:  While our framework can support the finding of Davies and Ormosi (2014) that 
the fraction of harm removed by a CA can vary from 55% to 85% depending on the 
probability of detection, it also shows that this conclusion is at the top end of the range and is 
very sensitive to (implicit) assumptions about the other key intervention parameters,  and .? ?   
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
47We are grateful to Khadija Lateef, an undergraduate student of Economics at the University of St Andrews for 
research assistance in undertaking the computations in this section.  
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The other aspect of CA performance is that CAs want to understand how large is the Total 
Effect of their interventions relative to the direct effect that they can measure – what we call 
the Observable Direct Effect.  That is they want to understand how large is TE ODE ,  but 
also  how is this attributed to the indirect deterrence effect and the indirect price effect.  From 
equation (34) we know that the magnitude of TE ODE  depends on three other terms: how 
large are the Indirect Deterrence and Indirect Price Effects relative to the “true” Direct Effect  
(RIDE and RIPE, respectively), and how large is /DE ODE  - the ratio of the “true” Direct 
Effect to the Observable Direct Effect (Davies  and Ormosi’s Detected Harm). 
Table 2 sets out the answers to these questions by presenting figures for TE ODE  followed 
by its three components RIDE, RIPE and /DE ODE .  Once again all these calculations have 
been performed assuming 0.9, 0.8, 0.1? ? ?? ? ? . 
 
Table 2a: TE ODE  
 
? 
?  1 0.8 
? 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.3 
0.9  8.359 7.729 7.416 8.649 8.063 7.751 
0.5  3.365 3.251 3.179 3.475 3.386 3.331 
0.1  2.193 2.159 2.139 2.279 2.259 2.250 
 
Table 2b: RIDE IDE DE?  
 
? 
?  1   0.8  
? 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.3 
0.9  1.639 2.246 2.898 1.560 2.062 2.601 
0.5  1.462 1.728 2.014 1.484 1.715 1.963 
0.1  1.540 1.738 1.951 1.610 1.790 1.982 
 
Table 2c: RIPE IPE DE?
 
? 
?  1   0.8  
? 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.3 
0.9  -0.039 -0.068 -0.107 -0.042 -0.070 -0.104 
0.5  -0.070 -0.092 -0.117 -0.082 -0.104 -0.128 
0.1  -0.103 -0.124 -0.147 -0.124 -0.145 -0.167 
 
Table 2d: /DE ODE  
 
? 
?  1   0.8  
? 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.3 
0.9  3.210 2.432 1.957 3.435 2.695 2.217 
0.5  1.410 1.233 1.098 1.447 1.297 1.175 
0.1  0.900 0.826 0.763 0.916 0.854 0.799 
?30?
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One general conclusion that emerges from this is that although the indirect price effect is 
negative its absolute magnitude is small and doesn’t contribute much to our understanding of 
what drives the link between the Total Effect of a CA’s interventions and the Observable 
Direct Effect (ODE) that CAs can measure. So, in the discussion that follows we will say no 
more about it. The important effects that are at work are:  the unobserved deterrence effect 
that everyone recognises and discusses, but also a second factor that has so far received no 
attention – the fact that the Observable Direct Effect significantly mis-measures the “true” 
Direct Effect.  
If we start once again with the situation that is closest to that implicitly assumed by Davies 
and Ormosi (2014) – i.e. where 1, 0.9? ?? ? -  then we see from the first row on the LHS of 
Table 2a the total effect of a CA’s interventions may be between 7.5 and 8.5 times greater 
than the Observable Direct Effect. This is in part because the neglect of the Indirect 
Deterrence Effect, which, from Table 2b can vary between 1.6 and 2.9 times the Direct 
Effect, but also because of the neglect of the fact that the “true” Direct Effect varies from 1.9 
to 3.2 times the Observable Direct Effect.48 However, once again, these conclusions are very 
sensitive to what we assume about the parameter values – particularly the probability of 
keeping the industry competitive, ? -  where the Total Effect will be just over twice as large as 
the Observed Direct Effect when ? = 0.1. But this sensitivity is largely driven by the fact that 
the ratio of the true Direct Effect to the Observable Direct Effect is very sensitive to the 
assumed value of ? – see footnote 30 above. On the other hand the conclusions are not 
terribly sensitive to variations in either  ? or ?.   
Our figures are lower than those reported in Davies and Ormosi (2014), Table 1 even in their 
case where, as here, the probability of detection is constant.  For they report that the Total 
Harm is 13.0 times the Detected Harm, while Deterred Harm is 7.8 times Detected Harm.  
So clearly the differences in methodology do matter when trying to put a figure on these 
important ratios.  
We summarise our findings in: 
Result 2: 
(i) The Total Effect is around 8 times as large as the Observable Direct Effect when 
0.9? ?  but this drops to just over 3 when ? = 0.5 and just over 2 when ? = 0.1. 
(ii) There are two important effects at work: 
a. the unmeasured Indirect Deterrence Effect which is between 1.5 and 2.9 times 
as large as the Direct Effect depending on the various parameter values; 
b. the fact that the true Direct Effect differs significantly from the Observable 
Direct Effect,   
(iii) the ratio of the true Direct Effect to the Observable Direct Effect is very sensitive 
to the assumed value of ?,  taking values around 2 to 3 when ? = 0.9 , but just  
0.75 to 0.9 when ? = 0.1. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
48 Taken together these imply that the Indirect Deterrence Effect is around 5.3 to 5.4 times as large as the 
Observable Direct Effect 
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(iv) Because we have assumed that penalties are based on revenue and that both the 
probability of detection and the penalty rate are independent of the cartel price, the  
Indirect Price Effect is negative (as theory predicts), but our results show that it is 
very small in absolute magnitude.  
 
5.1.1 Sensitivity to Model Parameters 
We have undertaken calculations of how the measured values of the deterrence and total 
effects of a CA’s interventions vary with the two key model parameters,   and  ? ? .  The 
Appendix shows how the values of  0, ,   and  RIDE TE H TE ODE?  that we presented 
above vary as we allow each of the two model parameters to vary over the ranges specified 
above.   
We conclude that the results are not very sensitive to the assumed values of the inverse 
elasticity of demand, ?.   However, given the dynamic nature of our framework where we 
examine the way in which current interventions affect future behaviour of cartels, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that our conclusions are rather sensitive to the assumed value of the 
discount factor, ?.  So for example, we reported above that, when 1  and  0.9? ?? ?  then the 
fraction of potential harm removed, 0TE H  varies from 55% through 75% to 85% as the 
probability of successful prosecution, ?, varies from 0.1 through 0.2 to 0.3.  However, these 
fractions rise to 71%, 87% and 93% respectively when 0.98? ? ,  and fall to 41%, 62% and 
73% respectively when 0.8? ? . Similarly the values reported above for the ratio of the Total 
Effect to the Observable Direct Effect, TE ODE , were 8.4, 7.7 and 7.4 respectively.  These 
values rise to 13.3, 12.2 and 11.7 respectively when 0.98? ? ,  and fall to 5.5, 5.1 and 5.0  
when 0.8? ? .   
So we see that considerable thought needs to be given to the appropriate choice of discount 
rate when placing numerical values on various measures of the total effectiveness of CA 
interventions.  
5.1.2 Sensitivity to Penalty Rate 
As indicated above Competition Authorities would like to know how the effectiveness of 
their interventions varies “depending on differences in competition policy enforcement.”? ?To 
address this question we keep our model parameters at their central values:  0.9, 0.8? ?? ?    
but now allow the penalty rate to take the value 0.2? ? .   We know from the theory that an 
increase in the penalty rate will: 
? have no effect on ?; 
? since 
0
( ) 0d
d
?
?
? ?  it will improve deterrence; 
? it will cause cartels to increase the price. 
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Since the indirect price effects are typically very small we expect this latter effect to be 
dominated by the second.   
We report below how the values for 0TE H and for TE ODE  that we presented above in 
Tables 1 and 2a respectively change when we use this new value of the penalty rate. 
 
Table 1 ?: 0TE H , 0.9, 0.8, 0.2? ? ?? ? ?   
 
? 
?  1   0.8  
? 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.3 
0.9  0.565 0.765 0.858 0.503 0.712 0.818
0.5  0.302 0.495 0.626 0.261 0.441 0.571
0.1  0.217 0.380 0.505 0.188 0.337 0.457
 
Table 2a?: TE ODE , 0.9, 0.8, 0.2? ? ?? ? ?  
 
? 
?  1   0.8  
? 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.3 
0.9  8.798 8.378 8.322 9.163 8.796 8.750
0.5  3.711 3.693 3.737 3.896 3.912 3.982
0.1  2.521 2.558 2.624 2.681 2.742 2.829
 
As we can see and as both ratios 0TE H and TE ODE  are indeed increasing in ?, though, 
particularly for 0TE H , the effect is quite small. 
 
5.2  The Marginal  Welfare Effects of a Competition Authority’s Interventions 
As reported in Section 4 – particularly in equations (41)-(44) -  the four enforcement 
parameters work through very different channels.  As a consequence the magnitudes of the 
various marginal effects depend on rather different parameters.   So, from (42), the marginal 
effect of an increase in ? depends solely on ?, while the marginal effect of an increase in ? 
depends additionally on the associated value of ?.  However the marginal effects of an 
increase in the penalty rate, ?,  depend on the values of ?, ? and ?, since these last two 
parameters determine ?.   From (44)  the marginal effect of an increase in ? therefore depends 
on ?, ?, ? and ?. 
Now, from Table A1 in the Appendix we find that if we set our 3 intervention parameters 
? ?, ,? ? ?  to their maximum assumed values – namely ? ?0.3,1.0,0.9  - then the associated 
value of ? is 0.413; while if we set them to their minimum assumed values – namely 
? ?0.1,0.8,0.1 - then the associated value of ? is 0.927.  If we set the values of   and  ? ?  to 
their intermediate values of 0.2 and 0.5 respectively, and set 1? ?  we get the intermediate 
value of 0.753? ? .  Since the values of the associated intervention parameters are therefore 
uniquely associated with each of these three values of ?, in what follows we will report the 
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results by referring solely to the value of ?.  We have also used the central values for the 
remaining parameters – i.e. we have set 0.9, 0.1, 0.8? ? ?? ? ? .  
Table 3:  Marginal Effects 
? 
.H
H
?
?
? ???? ??? ?  .
H
H
?
?
? ???? ??? ?  .
H
H
?
?
? ???? ??? ?  .
H
H
?
?
? ???? ??? ?  
0.413 1.263 1.174 5.005 0.089 
0.753 0.557 0.494 0.404 0.057 
0.927 0.174 0.146 0.014 0.028 
 
In the Appendix we report how these different marginal effects decompose into their 
associated Direct Effects and Indirect Deterrence and Price Effects. So we have: 
Result 3  For the range of parameter values considered here: 
(i) For all four enforcement parameters the elasticities relating to their total effect are 
smaller than 1; 
(ii) Increasing the probability of successful investigation, ?, has a more powerful 
impact than increasing the probability of closing cartels down following an 
investigation, ?; 
(iii) The effectiveness of raising the probability of keeping an industry competitive 
once a cartel has been shut down, ?, rises sharply with the value of ? itself. 
(iv) Because it generates no direct effect, increasing the penalty rate has an 
effectiveness that is between 1/14th and 1/6th  of that of increasing the probability 
of successful detection. 
To summarize we can conclude that on average the marginal effect of an increase in the 
penalty rate is around ten times smaller than the marginal effect of an increase in the 
probability of successful prosecution. Secondly, potentially the most powerful marginal effect 
is that of longer-term interventions aiming at preventing recidivism – but this is very sensitive 
to the existing level of recidivism and to the toughness of antitrust enforcement (i.e. the level 
of probability of successful prosecution and the amount of the resources the CA puts in 
preventing recidivism both in the short and in the long term). For example, for the case with 
the strongest (toughest) CA (see the first row in Table 3), marginal effect of long-term 
interventions aiming at preventing recidivism (i.e. ?) can be about 5 times higher than the 
marginal effects of other two interventions. However, for the weakest CA (see the last row in 
Table 3), marginal effect of ? is smaller than the marginal effects of other interventions. 
 
6 Concluding Remarks 
We have presented a model of cartel formation capturing the process of the birth and death of 
cartels that allows an explicit characterization of the effects on welfare of a wide range of 
policy instruments. We distinguish between a direct effect of detecting and stopping cartels, 
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as well as an indirect-deterrence effect of reducing the cartel rate (i.e. the fraction of cartels 
out of those that would exist in the absence of a CA that exist in its presence and given its 
enforcement activities) and an indirect-price effect or effect on the price set by the cartels that 
form. We have used this model to obtain a number of Propositions through which we 
characterize the total welfare effect of the presence of a competition authority and the 
marginal effects of the various enforcement interventions.  
Though our contribution has related concerns and objectives to that of Davies and Ormosi 
(2014), their conceptual framework and modeling approach is very different to the one 
presented above. While some of our numerical results are very similar to theirs, others are 
significantly different, so the difference in methodologies really matters.   
 
Although our framework is very rich, there are a number of extensions that can be made.  So, 
for example, our numerical simulations are based on the assumption that, while the penalty is 
based on revenue, both the penalty rate and the probability of detection are independent of the 
cartel price. As shown in Katsoulacos and Ulph (2013), if either of these are an increasing 
function of the cartel price then the cartel price will be lower than that used in the 
simulations. That could produce not just a positive indirect price effect but also a stronger 
deterrent effect. It would be fairly straightforward to undertake an extension to capture this 
possibility.   
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Appendix 
A1. Basic Setup 
As explained in the text, the model is based on parameters: , , , , ,c? ? ? ? ? , and on the two 
functions ( )  and  ( )Q p B p .  We make the following assumptions regarding these. 
(a)  Enforcement Parameters   
?:  This takes the 3 values: 0.1, 0.2, 0.3? ? .    
?:  This takes the 2 values:  1.0, 0.8? ? . 
?:  This takes the 3 values: 0.1, 0.5, 0.9? ? . 
?:  We assume that penalties are based on revenue and that neither the penalty rate nor the 
probability of detection depend on the cartel price.  In this Appendix we use the single value: 
0.1? ? ,  which implies that ? ???  takes the 3 values:  0.01, 0.02, 0.03? ? .  However to 
address the question of how the total effects of a CA’s interventions depend on the 
enforcement regime we have undertaken calculations for the case where 0.2? ? .  These are 
reported in the text. 
 
(b) Model Parameters 
 
c:  We normalise prices by assuming that the competitive price 1c ? .  Consistent with this 
latter assumption we assume that the demand function is ( ) 1Q p p?? ? ?  and that 
consequently the penalty base is ? ?( ) 1R p p p?? ? ? .  We use 0.8? ?   as the central value 
of the inverse demand elasticity parameter, but test the sensitivity of our measures of the total 
effectiveness of a CA’s interventions to this parameter by letting ? range across 
0.6, 0.8,1.0? ?   
 
?:  We use 0.9? ?   as our central value for the discount factor.  However to test the 
sensitivity of our measures of the total effectiveness of a CA’s interventions to this 
parameter, we let ? range across 0.8, 0.85, 0.9, 0.95, 0.98? ? .  
 
From KMU (2015) we know that, given our assumptions above about the demand function 
and the penalty base, the cartel price and the fraction of industries in which cartels would 
form if they were never disrupted are:  
  ? ?0 1( ) ; ( ) 1 (1 )
1 ( )
M
C M
M
c
cp p
c
? ?? ? ? ?? ?
? ?? ??? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ??? ? .  (A1)  
Given our assumptions about the form of the demand function, the various formulae relevant 
to our calculations are: 
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? ?
? ?
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
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(1 ) (1 )
2 (1 )(1 ) 1 (1 )
1 ;
2 (1 ) (1 ) 3 (1 )
C CQ p p
? ?
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ?? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? ??? ?? ?? ?
? ? ? ? ?? ?? ? ?? ?? ? ? ? ?? ?
   (A2) 
 
A2. Calculating the Total Effect of CA Interventions 
Throughout this section we set a key enforcement parameter – the penalty rate – to 0.1? ?  . 
We begin by using equation (6) in the text to calculate the value of ? for the various values of 
the intervention parameters ?, ? and ? specified above.  These are given in Table A1 below.   
Table A1: ?  
0.9? ?  
 
? 
?  1   0.8  
? 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.3 
0.9  0.679 0.514 0.413 0.725 0.569 0.468 
0.5  0.859 0.753 0.671 0.884 0.793 0.718 
0.1  0.910 0.835 0.771 0.927 0.863 0.808 
 
From this and equation (35) we can immediately calculate the ratio of the “true” Direct Effect 
to the Observable Direct Effect.   
Table A2: DE ODE  
0.9? ?  
 
? 
?  1   0.8  
? 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.3 
0.9  3.210 2.430 1.957 3.438 2.694 2.217 
0.5  1.410 1.235 1.097 1.450 1.294 1.175 
0.1  0.900 0.825 0.763 0.912 0.856 0.800 
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Notice also from equations in  (A2) above that the expressions for consumer surplus under 
both competition and monopoly -  and hence the value of potential harm 0H , which is the 
difference between these  -  depend solely on the inverse elasticity, ?.  The values of these 
variables are given in Table A3 below. 
Table A3:  Potential Harm 
? 0.6 0.8 1.0 
( )CS c  0.180 0.320 1 
? ?MC S p  0.045 0.08 0.125 
0H  0.135 0.240 0.375 
 
The remaining calculations that appear in the text depend on the values of the three 
intervention parameters , ,? ? ?  , the inverse elasticity of demand, ?,  and the discount rate, ?.   
We begin by testing the sensitivity of our measures of the total effectiveness of a CA’s 
interventions to the value of the model parameter, ?, by setting the discount rate to its central 
value 0.9? ?  and letting ? range over the three values 0.6, 0.8,1.0? ? .    
Table A4 sets out the values for ?  - the fraction of those industries in which cartels would 
have formed in the absence of a CA in which they also form given the presence on an active 
CA -  and for 0TE H - the fraction of potential harm removed by the competition authority. 
Table A5 sets out the values of RIDE - the ratio of the Indirect Deterrence Effect of a CA’s 
interventions to their Direct Effect -  and for TE ODE  - the ratio of the Total Effect to the 
Observable Direct Effect.  As reported in the text,  RIPE - the ratio of the Indirect Price 
Effect of a CA’s interventions to their Direct Effect – is negative, but very small in absolute 
value, so, to avoid  having tables with too many figures to digest we have not included 
figures for this in Table A5.  They are available from the authors on request.  
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Table A4: Sensitivity of  0  and  TE H? to ? 
0.9, 0.1? ?? ?  
    ?    0TE H   
  ? 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.6 0.8 1.0 
? ? ?       
  0.9 0.649 0.655 0.658 0.555 0.552 0.550 
 0.1 0.5 0.822 0.829 0.834 0.286 0.281 0.279 
  0.1 0.871 0.878 0.883 0.199 0.194 0.191 
  0.9 0.470 0.478 0.483 0.754 0.751 0.749 
1 0.2 0.5 0.689 0.701 0.708 0.470 0.463 0.459 
  0.1 0.764 0.777 0.785 0.349 0.341 0.336 
  0.9 0.360 0.370 0.376 0.846 0.843 0.842 
 0.3 0.5 0.585 0.602 0.611 0.595 0.587 0.582 
  0.1 0.673 0.691 0.702 0.465 0.454 0.448 
  0.9 0.694 0.700 0.703 0.491 0.488 0.486 
 0.1 0.5 0.846 0.853 0.858 0.244 0.239 0.237 
  0.1 0.887 0.895 0.899 0.169 0.164 0.161 
  0.9 0.520 0.530 0.535 0.698 0.694 0.692 
0.8 0.2 0.5 0.725 0.738 0.746 0.413 0.405 0.401 
  0.1 0.789 0.803 0.812 0.304 0.296 0.291 
  0.9 0.408 0.420 0.426 0.803 0.799 0.797 
 0.3 0.5 0.627 0.644 0.654 0.536 0.527 0.521 
  0.1 0.705 0.724 0.736 0.412 0.401 0.394 
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Table A5: Sensitivity of   and  RIDE TE ODE  to ? 
0.9, 0.1? ?? ?  
    RIDE    TE ODE
 
 
  ? 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.6 0.8 1.0 
? ? ?       
  0.9 1.680 1.639 1.615 8.448 8.359 8.306 
 0.1 0.5 1.536 1.462 1.419 3.435 3.365 3.323 
  0.1 1.648 1.540 1.475 2.259 2.193 2.154 
  0.9 2.322 2.246 2.201 7.857 7.729 7.654 
1 0.2 0.5 1.831 1.728 1.668 3.338 3.251 3.200 
  0.1 1.876 1.738 1.657 2.238 2.159 2.113 
  0.9 3.023 2.898 2.824 7.589 7.416 7.316 
 0.3 0.5 2.152 2.014 1.934 3.285 3.179 3.118 
  0.1 2.124 1.951 1.851 2.231 2.139 2.085 
  0.9 1.605 1.560 1.534 8.753 8.649 8.587 
 0.1 0.5 1.570 1.484 1.432 3.560 3.475 3.424 
  0.1 1.741 1.610 1.533 2.360 2.279 2.231 
  0.9 2.139 2.062 2.016 8.207 8.063 7.978 
0.8 0.2 0.5 1.831 1.715 1.647 3.490 3.386 3.326 
  0.1 1.951 1.790 1.695 2.354 2.259 2.203 
  0.9 2.723 2.601 2.530 7.942 7.751 7.641 
 0.3 0.5 2.114 1.963 1.876 3.455 3.331 3.259 
  0.1 2.179 1.982 1.868 2.360 2.250 2.186 
 
It is clear from both these Tables that the ratio 0TE H  is pretty insensitive to the value of  
the inverse elasticity, ?, which is why, in the text,  we have reported values solely for 0.8? ? .    
We now explore the sensitivity of our measures of the total effectiveness of a CA’s 
interventions to the model parameter ?.  To do this we set the inverse elasticity of demand to 
its central value 0.8? ? and let ? range over the 5 parameters 0.8, 0.85, 0.9, 0.95, 0.98? ? .  
Table A4a (resp. A5a)  reports results for the widest range of variation in ?, namely, 
0.8, 0.9, 0.98? ? .  While we have also undertaken calculations for a narrower range of 
variation – namely 0.85, 0.9, 0.95? ? -  the results are much as to be expected from results 
reported, and are available from the authors on request.   
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Table A4a:  Sensitivity of 0  and  TE H?  to ? 
0.8, 0.1? ?? ?  
    ?    0TE H   
  ? 0.8 0.9 0.98 0.8 0.9 0.98 
? ? ?       
  0.9 0.752 0.655 0.527 0.411 0.552 0.710 
 0.1 0.5 0.852 0.829 0.810 0.242 0.281 0.315 
  0.1 0.888 0.878 0.871 0.176 0.194 0.208 
  0.9 0.592 0.478 0.350 0.617 0.751 0.866 
1 0.2 0.5 0.735 0.701 0.672 0.411 0.463 0.507 
  0.1 0.793 0.777 0.765 0.314 0.341 0.362 
  0.9 0.483 0.370 0.257 0.734 0.843 0.925 
 0.3 0.5 0.640 0.602 0.569 0.532 0.587 0.631 
  0.1 0.711 0.691 0.676 0.423 0.454 0.478 
  0.9 0.786 0.700 0.580 0.355 0.488 0.649 
 0.1 0.5 0.872 0.853 0.837 0.205 0.239 0.269 
  0.1 0.902 0.895 0.888 0.149 0.164 0.176 
  0.9 0.639 0.530 0.400 0.555 0.694 0.826 
0.8 0.2 0.5 0.767 0.738 0.712 0.358 0.405 0.447 
  0.1 0.817 0.803 0.793 0.271 0.296 0.314 
  0.9 0.532 0.420 0.299 0.677 0.799 0.898 
 0.3 0.5 0.679 0.644 0.614 0.473 0.527 0.570 
  0.1 0.742 0.724 0.711 0.372 0.401 0.423 
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Table A5a: Sensitivity of   and  RIDE TE ODE   to ? 
0.8, 0.1? ?? ?  
    RIDE    TE ODE
 
 
  ? 0.8 0.9 0.98 0.8 0.9 0.98 
? ? ?       
  0.9 1.495 1.639 1.976 5.535 8.359 13.349 
 0.1 0.5 1.481 1.462 1.459 2.823 3.365 3.863 
  0.1 1.577 1.540 1.517 1.970 2.193 2.373 
  0.9 1.894 2.246 2.979 5.127 7.729 12.191 
1 0.2 0.5 1.715 1.728 1.756 2.750 3.251 3.707 
  0.1 1.764 1.738 1.726 1.948 2.159 2.349 
  0.9 2.32 2.898 4.057 4.950 7.416 11.726 
 0.3 0.5 1.966 2.014 2.074 2.704 3.179 3.611 
  0.1 1.965 1.951 1.949 1.936 2.139 2.302 
  0.9 1.467 1.560 1.815 5.608 8.649 13.871 
 0.1 0.5 1.521 1.484 1.466 2.921 3.475 3.986 
  0.1 1.663 1.610 1.578 2.053 2.279 2.462 
  0.9 1.803 2.062 2.633 5.341 8.063 12.708 
0.8 0.2 0.5 1.728 1.715 1.722 2.868 3.386 3.861 
  0.1 1.834 1.790 1.765 2.042 2.259 2.434 
  0.9 2.164 2.601 3.512 5.181 7.751 12.197 
 0.3 0.5 1.949 1.963 1.996 2.836 3.331 3.782 
  0.1 2.017 1.982 1.965 2.040 2.250 2.419 
 
We see that the conclusions – particularly those relating to the ratio of the Total Effect to the 
Observable Direct Effect, TE ODE -  are sensitive to the discount rate assumed.   
 
A3. Calculating the Marginal Effects of Competition Authority Interventions 
Using equations (41) – (44) and the calculations reported in Tables 1 and 3 we can calculate 
the marginal effects – in elasticity form - of an increase in each of the four enforcement 
parameters, , , ,i ? ? ? ?? .  For each enforcement parameter we report the Total Effect
.L iTE
i L
?? ?? ?? ??? ? , the Direct Effect .
iDE
i
?
?
?? ?? ?? ??? ?  the Indirect Deterrence Effect
. iIDE
i
? ???? ?? ?? ?? ?
 and the Indirect Price Effect .
C
C
p iIPE
i p
? ??? ?? ??? ?
, which  are related by 
? ?? ?CTE DE IDE p IPE?? ? ? ? .  The factors that affect the magnitude of these effects differ 
across the enforcement parameters.  Since ? operates through both its impact on  ? and its 
impact on ? the magnitudes of the effects depend on both ? and ?.  Since ? operates solely 
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through its effect on ? the magnitudes of its effects depend solely on ?.  While ? also operates 
only through its effect on ?, the magnitude of these effects depend on both ? and ?.  Finally, 
since ? has no direct effect and operates solely through its impact on ? the magnitude of its 
impact depend on both ? and ?.  
As discussed in the text we undertake the calculations for three different values of ? – namely 
0.413, 0.753, 0.927? ?  - and the uniquely associated values of  ?, ? and ?.  We also use the 
central values for the remaining parameters – i.e. we have set 0.9, 0.1, 0.8? ? ?? ? ? .  
Table A6b: Marginal Effects of Increases in ? 
?  0.927 0.753 0.413 
DE  0.073 0.247 0.587 
IDE  0.109 0.321 0.701 
IPE  -0.0036 -0.0074 -0.0113 
TE  0.174 0.551 1.263 
 
Table A6b: Marginal Effects of Increases in ? 
?  0.927 0.753 0.413 
DE  0.073 0.247 0.587 
IDE  0.073 0.247 0.587 
IPE  0 0 0 
TE  0.146 0.494 1.174 
 
Table A6c: Marginal Effects of Increases in ? 
?  0.927 0.753 0.413 
DE  0.007 0.202 2.502 
IDE  0.007 0.202 2.502 
IPE  0 0 0 
TE  0.014 0.404 5.005 
 
Table A6d: Marginal Effects of Increases in ? 
?  0.927 0.753 0.413 
DE  0 0 0 
IDE  0.036 0.074 0.114 
IPE  -0.0036 -0.0074 -0.0113 
TE  0.028 0.057 0.089 
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